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DOMESTIC INEQUALITY AND MULTILATERAL ACTION: AN 
EXAMINATION OF DIRECTIONAL RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper seeks to examine the relationship between domestic level inequalities 
and broader international behavior, specifically that involving multiple state actors. It is 
hypothesized that increasing levels of domestic inequality will lead towards a decrease 
in willingness towards multilateral action. The sampling of inequalities spans the realms 
of income distribution, gender, and educational attainment while attitudes towards 
multilateral action are characterized by participation in treaties and participation in 
international organizations. Poisson regression analysis is used to analyze the compiled 
statistical findings, and a high degree of significance is shown in both models for the 
dependent variables, though neither is remarkably powerful. Ultimately, this paper 
serves as a kind of proof of concept for opening up future avenues of research 
connecting inequality and multilateral action.  
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THE EFFECT OF DOMESTIC INEQUALITY ON MULTILATERAL ACTION 
For many international relations theories like realism, the work that comes out of 
the field focuses on the state as consistent unitary actors with a rational set of specified 
preferences. Work that focuses on a domestic level analysis, however, tends to 
emphasize the variety of opinions and complexity of internal institutions that produces 
various types of behavior. Domestic level factors tend to provide a level of nuance not 
available in a more macro level project at the expense of time, effort, and simplicity. 
This research project aims to synthesize these points of view by using domestic level 
factors to explain, at least in part, the singular course of action a nation chooses to take 
on an international scale regarding cooperation with another nation. The purpose of this 
paper is to determine what, if any, effect domestic level inequalities have on a nation's 
willingness towards multilateral action. Domestic inequality in this paper centers 
around the dimensions of gender, income, and education though a full treatment of the 
concept would be more robust in terms of what gets discussed. The attitudes that create 
the willingness toward multilateral action, on the other hand, are expressed via 
participation in multilateral institutions and treaties. This, too, is shorthand for a more 
full treatment of this concept for the purposes of this paper. Directionally it is theorized 
that increased levels of domestic inequality will decrease the levels of participation 
serving as proxy for a positive attitude towards multilateral action. 
After reviewing the literature and examining the typical interpretation of theory 
that informs the research question and directional hypotheses for this project, this paper 
turns to explaining the need for examining the cumulative effects of domestic level 
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factors on international behavior. It then goes on to discuss what proxy variables will be 
used to model the overarching concepts of inequality and attitudes toward multilateral 
action. This will include an examination of the shortcomings of available data and 
avenues for future research refinement. Finally, summary statistics are run on the 
resulting variables in order to describe the landscape of data that are then put through 
Poisson regression analysis and interpreted to find relevant conclusions about the 
relationship between inequality and multilateral action. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
To understand the formation of this research question and hypothesis, it helps to 
understand the tradition of pragmatism in international relations, current attitudes 
towards multilateral action, and the current research on the varying dimensions of 
inequality. Typically characterized as a preference for efficacy in methods above all else, 
pragmatist international relations attempts to answer relevant pressing questions and 
problems with those methods best suited to the analysis of said questions rather than 
pursuing a distinct commitment to a certain type of inquiry (Kaag and Kreps 2012). This 
level of flexibility in theoretical thinking opens up the arena of discourse by broadening 
the available set of methods; pragmatist research projects are not, for example, limited 
only to those questions which are amenable to statistical analysis because a variety of 
alternative methods for generating insight and knowledge are readily accepted and 
available for the pragmatists. This methodological and inquiry based freedom informs 
the scope and directionality of this question which hopes to open up a typical less 
explored area of academic discourse. This theoretical background also helps ground the 
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propriety of the blended view of methods taken in response to literature and definitions 
of concepts presented later in this literature review. 
Domestic inequality exists as an umbrella term for several more distinct issues 
considered on a national scale. Lemel and Noll (2002) outline several types of inequality 
in their book on the subject including gender, income and education. Gender inequality 
is characterized by significant differences in opportunity, resources, and dimensions of 
power (Lemel and Noll 2002: 333). A reduction in gender based inequalities has already 
been linked with reduced instances of first use of force in military conflicts, 
substantiating the idea that this dimension of inequality is linked in some way to 
behavior on the international stage (Caprioli 2003: 205). It is reasonable, then, to 
intuitively think that gender inequalities would have some type of effect on multilateral 
action, insofar as multilateral action is constituted of military conflicts. Income 
inequality can be divided up into distribution of "market incomes" which is known as 
"primary distribution" and "secondary distribution" which factors in any efforts by the 
state to mitigate income inequality (Lemel and Noll 2002: 189). This means that 
primary distribution is best for modeling absolute earning conditions and can speak to 
the nature of the general economy in relevant areas across nations. This is demonstrated 
with an extensive Australian case study in Who Gets What?, that showcases mainly 
primary distribution while bringing in secondary distribution to capture more nuance 
with state efforts to address inequality and to compare the Australian case to other 
states (Stilwell and Jordan 2007: 42-43). Though often critiqued for its lack of nuance, 
the Gini index is frequently used for the purpose of measuring this type of inequality 
because it is a single summary statistic that identifies how equitable the distribution of a 
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given resource is and can be interpreted in a number of useful ways beyond creating 
direct comparisons across a spatial or temporal dimension (Farris 2010: 851). Similarly, 
educational inequalities can be usefully bifurcated into inequality in absolute versus 
relative terms; absolute inequality cares about lack of access to a given level of 
education, whereas relative inequality looks at the reinforcement of social hierarchy that 
creates a state of deprivation in education for certain groups in a society (Lemel and 
Noll 2002: 221). Further complicating the issue is the idea that educational inequality 
can also be defined in terms of opportunity versus quality. Attendance and access make 
up much of the opportunity dimension, but attending a certain level of schooling does 
not equal a guarantee of the same quality of access across the board (Ferreira and 
Gignoux 2014). More analysis than just access trends must be done to ensure equitable 
comparisons. This prevents situations where primary completion for one observation is 
equal in quality to secondary completion in another observation but no way to equate 
the two exists. While opportunity can be, somewhat naively but sufficient for a cursory 
understanding, quantified by various attendance statistics for schools, qualitative type of 
inequality is best exemplified through achievement score data which is often hard to 
obtain due to the costs and time involved in administering tests. All measures of 
inequality, however, exhibit some level of difficulty in quantification and data collection 
because of their innate complexity, and this fact is reflected heavily in the literature. The 
difficulty of selecting a useful and effective measure for educational attainment, for 
example, is demonstrated in Fraumeni's work where several options and their respective 
drawbacks are presented as sufficient given certain sets of circumstances (Fraumeni 
2015). Ultimately none of these factors exist in complete isolation; many of these 
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variables have intersecting dimensions or similar causes, and analysis of inequality 
should aim at examining these factors in conjunction or at least note the fact that they 
are often complex and intertwined issues (Lemel and Noll 2002: 432). Gender 
inequality calculations, for example, often turn to inequality in income and earning 
potential between genders to indicate an imbalance of social power and resources. This 
type of connection pushes these facets of inequality to be considered related though they 
each incorporate enough nuance and unique components to remain distinct. 
The other key component of this research project is willingness toward 
multilateral action. Attitude based variables, such as this one focused on a willingness or 
affinity for a certain set of actions, are often difficult to quantify because there is very 
rarely a direct measure for the perceptions necessary to model relationship. Further, 
attitudinal variables are often focused around essentially contested concepts which 
makes any attempt to quantify them fraught with criticism. When examining 
multilateral institutions and actions several factors come into question. First among 
them is the question of what motivates action. Murphy and Weiss (2007) explore 
multilateral peace and security in their article, coming from a popular point of view that 
sees multilateral action as occurring because nations are spurred to act by some 
motivating outside force. This model argues that something like a global environmental 
crisis or some kind of state violation of rights would act as the inciting incident for 
multilateral action which is then characterized by reactionary intervention. In addition 
to this postulation, Murphy and Weiss asses the concerns of international relations 
analysts to determine the main issues that require attention and awareness. 
Interestingly, nine areas of concern with the potential to incite multilateral action are 
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discussed within the article with each of the other eight being tied back to the idea of 
global inequality (Murphy and Weiss 2007). For example, the authors note that, 
throughout the survey, analysts commented on how “environmental crises 
(demographic pressure, disease and famine) evolve along with and reinforce inequality 
and the welfare crises,” in addition to how these factors extend beyond themselves 
influence the other issues (119). Though mentioned in passing by these authors, that 
sentiment is an important one in informing the choice of focusing on domestic 
inequalities within this research; in tying back their areas of concern to inequality, 
Murphy and Weiss lay the groundwork for a project like this to expand upon the role of 
inequality in determining multilateral action. The next key question to consider in this 
arena regards how preferences, affinities, and general willingness actually manifest in 
measurable ways. At its most basic level, willingness towards multilateral action can be 
reflected in terms of participation in various multilateral institutions. Bøås and McNeil 
explain within their book Multilateral Institutions: A Critical Introduction the rise in 
number and importance of multilateral institutions following the developments of the 
Brenton Woods Conference in the post-World War II system. However, while 
membership is an important indicator, it is not sufficient to stand alone as the figure 
necessary to understand willingness towards multilateral action. Popular resistance to 
these multilateral institutions plays an important role in determining attitude, which is 
a dimension that Bøås and McNeil explore. As an example, from their text explaining 
the rise of popular resistance to institutions they note a particular civil society- 
Association pour une Taxation des Transactions Financièrs pour L’aide aux Citoyens or 
ATTAC- as one of many that brings an element of popular protest against multilateral 
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action (specifically in this case against the World Bank, IMF, and WTO) (2). Ideally, an 
examination of protests would help explain the dimension of popular resistance to 
multilateral associations and action. Finally, membership in an institution or a lack of 
popular protest does not equate to active participation. For this reason, an examination 
of actual legislation of treaties that nations sign on to is an important factor in 
determining this attitudinal variable. 
With the literature on each variable addressed to some degree and context given 
for the ways in which these concepts are operationalized, literature regarding the 
relation of these two variables deserves some attention. Often the research on the 
relationship between inequality and multilateral action focuses on the opposite 
directionality; pieces of multilateral legislation or the work of multilateral institutions 
are examined for their efficacy in mitigating various types of domestic inequalities. In 
one such article “International Human Rights and Domestic Income Inequality" 
explores the idea of connecting income inequality with the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (Cole 2015). Cole's use of the ICESCR 
show the need to extend the conception of multilateral action beyond mere membership 
in institutions and towards substantive content. The opposite directionality of Cole's 
hypothesis to this paper also indicates that there is possible problem for work 
attempting to show clear lines of causality; since various forms of multilateral action are 
seen to have an effect on domestic inequalities, showing that those same inequalities 
seem to affect a willingness towards multilateral action would cause problems for clear 
cut arguments of causality. That said, Cole's work explores and connects only one type of 
inequality with one piece of multilateral legislation. This extensive case study, as it were, 
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of the ICESCR operates on loosely the same principle as the premise of this paper- the 
idea that domestic inequalities at the national level are linked to the behavior of a nation 
on the international stage- but this paper hopes to expand this idea to multiple forms of 
inequality as well as multiple types of multilateral action instead of looking at just 
economic inequality and the ICESCR. In an ideal scenario, this paper would take a 
similar approach and develop a robust form of content analysis for actual multilateral 
decrees and treaty participation. Such a process would be time consuming but would 
help to develop an idea of what dimensions of inequality and multilateral action are 
most related. 
Standing in opposition to this theory of relation between domestic inequality and 
multilateral action are claims about state behavior being determined by structural 
differences and state power. Structural differences claim that the internal structure of 
nations take primacy in explaining the variance is strategy taken when dealing with 
other nations on international stage (McKibben 2013). This type of research expands on 
the insights of power analysis which takes state capabilities to be the determining factor 
of the characteristic of international action (Snider 1987). While not the subject of this 
research project, these competing perspectives are not mutually exclusive with this 
conception of inequalities taking on an important role. It is the case, rather, that 
inequalities can be seen as a mitigating factor when considering the strategic execution 
of bargaining in accordance with state power and the efficacy of institutions in that 
process. 
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Taken as a whole, the literature relating to this topic is varied and full of 
resources that share significant common ground only in their basic framework and 
assumptions. Though this paper seeks to connect with previous work in terms of shared 
definitions, variables of interest, and general pragmatic theory, it breaks with traditional 
assumptions of directionality and units of analysis in an attempt to bring more depth to 
the discussion of multilateral action in international relations. 
DATA AND METHODS 
The nature of this research question requires extensive use of proxy variables and 
operationalization of concepts in order to use the relevant statistical methods. Once the 
variables are adequately defined and compiled attention can shift to the application of 
the correct statistical methods to determine the relationship between the independent 
and dependent variables. In terms of the independent variable, domestic inequality 
exists across several categories. The dependent variable, willingness towards 
multilateral action, has no direct measure and must, therefore, be accounted for by 
various proxies. Though later projects or those with more time and funding would 
ideally include more variables, for the purpose of this model, income, gender, and 
educational inequality are examined as independent variables while multilateral action 
is characterized in terms of membership in organizations and treaty participation. Data 
collection was primarily left up to expert data bases with the exception of membership 
data in the fifteen relevant institutions. That variable was taken from official 
membership lists for the relevant institutions. The most recent numbers possible are 
considered for the involved variables, and for those that span a course of time like the 
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treaties only those items which began in 1950 or later and are still in effect were 
counted. This date was chosen because of the increase in multilateral institutions and 
considerations that coincided with the end of World War II as described in the literature 
review. Data was gathered for all one hundred ninety-three UN recognized countries in 
order to ensure the most statistical robustness possible. As discussed later in this 
section, however, this is not consistent with the full number of observations present in 
the model because of missing data from various sources. After a discussion of the 
variables and their sources, this paper turns to a brief discussion of the choice of 
regression model and summary statistics in order to make the relevant rationale behind 
these methodological clear. Tables showcasing the relevant information are then 
presented. 
Gender inequality, especially as seen in the literature review, is a bit imprecise in 
terms of definition to translate into statistical output. While other measures exist, this 
paper chooses to look at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and 
their Gender Inequality Index. The Gender Inequality Index is a compact statistic that 
examines a complex range of issues involved in gender based inequality. It takes 
reproductive health, empowerment, and relative economic status between male and 
female into account, details the extent to which women are disadvantaged in these 
areas, and is updated frequently thanks to UNDP's yearly reporting (UNDP 2018). The 
statistic is measured on a scale from zero to one and data was available for one hundred 
and sixty of the target countries. For all the strengths of the Gender Inequality Index, 
however, this paper does not claim it is a perfect measure or that it is the only valid 
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measure for gender inequality; it is simply a robust and trustworthy calculation that fits 
the purposes and definitions presented in this paper. 
Income inequality is expressed in data for the Gini scores of countries because 
the Gini index is able to compare inequality consistently across populations because it 
examines equity in distribution rather than just distribution itself (Farris 2010). This 
project looks specifically at secondary distribution through the Gini scores of disposable 
income (that is income distribution after taxes) meaning that any effort at wealth 
redistribution through taxation measures is taken into account (Solt, 2019). Combined, 
these two facts allow for the examination of income inequality to be relative to the 
country in questioned; by not associating monetary value to income the assessment of 
inequality is not biased towards countries with lower incomes in general since they 
would likely have smaller gaps in earning potential due to the smaller range of income. 
Additionally, using the disposable income measure adds nuance to the model’s 
assessment because it takes into account domestic policies that might exist to mitigate 
the effects of unequal earning and even out wealth distribution through taxes. 
Another form of inequality, educational inequality, requires a slightly more 
complicated breakdown and measure. As seen in the literature review, Ferreira and 
Gignoux (2013) describe the quantification of educational inequality as a two-part 
system that regards both the inequality in achievement and inequality in opportunity 
present within a nation. For both of these figures Ferreira and Gignoux extrapolate their 
results from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA), part of the 
OECD’s databank resources (Ferreira and Gignoux 2014: 213). Ferreira and Gignoux 
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argue throughout their paper that attendance is more insufficient than raw achievement 
data despite the fact that raw achievement data is still far from a perfect measure. 
Unfortunately, educational measures are typically rather incomplete datasets and often 
substitutions must be made for the most adequate data available. Drawing from the 
Barro-Lee dataset while fully recognizing the limitations of attendance data as a proxy 
for educational inequality, this paper operationalizes educational inequality as the 
percentage of people who have not attended primary school for this particular variable 
(Barro and Lee 2013). This measure is in no way ideal for this type of research, but the 
dataset is well regarded, more robust than many others available, is transparent about 
methods of collection and calculations, and provides a starting point for looking at 
research that has scope beyond pre-determined multilateral institutions that do their 
own testing (Fossen, Hinton, and Rowe 2004). Thus, until better measures are readily 
available, this data is sufficient for the purposes of this paper. 
As described in the literature review, participation in multilateral treaties and 
legislation is an important part of gauging willingness towards multilateral action. 
Examining treaties, which cover a wide range of topics and present an untenable 
amount of challenges for the scope and length of this research project. Focus, therefore, 
was narrowed to the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset, which 
focuses on military related treaties and facets of state versus state aggression like 
defense pact and  non-aggression treaties (Leeds Ritter Mitchell and Long 2002). 
Though this limits the scope of treaties examined to just one of many issues a nation 
may want to make agreements about, the dataset includes all treaties for countries that 
fit these parameters and were formed between 1815 and 2016 which is a robust set of 
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cases to choose from for a proof of concept with this variable. As indicated previously, 
because of the nature of multilateral action as a movement that is tied to the emergence 
of institutions in the post-World War II era, the cases that counted for the purposes of 
this paper were limited to those that began in the year 1950 or later and are (or were as 
of December 31, 2016 which is the end of the ATOP temporal dimension) still in effect. 
Treaties that fit these restrictions were tallied as integer numbers for each country of 
interest and placed into a final model after being compiled into a truncated list. The full 
ATOP dataset also includes information on treaties that spark creations of multinational 
organizations which would likely be overlooked in a typical examination of institutional 
membership, but due to constraints detailed below, this fact is merely noted here rather 
than robustly explored. 
Additionally, as stated before, the membership variable was the only one present 
that was not drawn from an expert database. Membership in multinational institutions 
was coded in a separate data sheet as a dummy variable where one stood in for 
membership and zero was representative of a non-member. The number of 
memberships were tallied up and placed in the final model for analysis. Fifteen 
institutions were considered based on a variety of literature for a combination of 
importance and typically subsuming smaller bodies (e.g. the United Nations is an 
overarching body that includes many subsidiary branches which would have been 
interesting to examine but were not because of the general restrictions that constrained 
the scope of this project) (Bøås and McNeill 2013; Fossen, Hinton, and Rowe 2004). The 
fifteen institutions examined are as follows: the Asian Development Bank (ADB); the 
African Development Bank (AfDB); the Bank for International Settlements (BIS); the 
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European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD); the European Central 
Bank (ECB); the European Union (EU); the International Commission on Large Dams 
(ICOLD); the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB); the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF); the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); the United Nations (UN); the World 
Bank (WB); the World Health Organization (WHO); and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).  
This type of research question and theory aim at understanding a wide scope of 
international behavior, making it important to look at as many cases as possible for 
theoretical and statistical robustness. Practical limitations, of course, get in the way of 
this mission. Most data sets were incomplete for the one hundred and ninety-three 
countries looked at; the dependent variable function as exceptions to this claim because 
they are coded as count data and zeros are accepted values if no data suiting the 
parameters exist. At worst, the educational data set from Barro-Lee has one hundred 
and forty-two of the necessary observations. This number is limited slightly more by the 
fact that those nations missing data do not always overlap; a country that is present in 
the educational dataset (which is the most restricted) is overwhelmingly likely to be but 
is not necessarily a part of a less restricted data set. Thus, once observations with 
incomplete data were removed from the model, one hundred and forty-one country 
observations remained to run through regression analysis. 
The flexibility in methods provided by pragmatist international relations theory 
gave a great deal of discretion in the selection of methods. In the end, Poisson regression 
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analysis was chosen because of the way that membership and treaty participation were 
coded. Both dependent variables to be represented as count data which meant that the 
appropriate method of determining correlation would be either negative binomial 
regression or Poisson regression analysis. Upon further investigation, the data 
supported the assumption of being distributed along the standard Poisson distribution, 
which meant Poisson was the correct choice over negative binomial regression for 
modeling the relationships present (Cameron and Trivedi 1998). In addition, general 
summary statistics were used for each variable to get an idea of what the overall data set 
looked like. For the sake of clarity, summary statistics for each of the variables were run 
for the full sets available and then for the countries put through regression analysis. This 
was done to help characterize the differences in the data after the appropriate 
restrictions were placed on the regression model. These summary statistics are 
represented in table one and two, while the regression models for multilateral 
institution membership and ATOPS treaty participation since 1950 are represented in 
tables three and four respectively. The full dataset for the model and the coding done for 
the participation in multilateral institutions, for the sake of transparency, is attached to 
this paper with relevant titles and additional explanation when needed, but is done so in 
an appendix for the sake of space and brevity. 
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TABLE 1. FULL DATA SUMMARY STATISTIC SET 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
edu 142 15.01423 18.28424 0 74.57 
gii 160 .3497 .1897236 .039 .834 
gini 185 .3860756 .0766298 .232356 .600238 
mli 193 7.487047 2.79715 2 15 
trt 193 5.222798 7.200051 0 53 
 
TABLE 2. REGRESSION SUMMARY STATISTIC SET 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
edu 141 15.06631 18.33885 0 74.57 
gii 141 .3487518 .193765 .039 .834 
gini 141 .3826361 .0790583 .2422 .600238 
mli 141 8.255319 2.816797 5 15 
trt 141 5.801418 7.755385 0 53 
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TABLE 3. INSTITUTION PARTICIPATION REGRESSION 
Log likelihood = -299.89408 
Number of obs= 141 
LR chi2(3)= 76.51 
Prob > chi2= 0.0000 
Pseudo R2= 0.1131 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
edu .0017567 .0025296 0.69 0.487 -.0032013 .0067146 
gii  -1.2767 .261309 -4.89 0.000 -1.788856 -.7645434 
gini  -.6072593 .4749054 -1.28 0.201 -1.538057 .3235383 
_cons  2.729286 .1485496 18.37 0.000 2.438134 3.020438 
 
 
 
TABLE 4. TREATY PARTICIPATION REGRESSION 
Log likelihood = -614.90887 
Number of obs= 141 
LR chi2(3)= 155.51 
Prob > chi2= 0.0000 
Pseudo R2= 0.1123 
 
Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] 
edu -.0098023 .0033486 -2.93 0.003 -.0163655 -.0032392 
gii -.2822726 .3240353 -0.87 0.384 -.91737 .3528249 
gini -4.191505 .628135 -6.67 0.000 -5.422627 -2.960383 
_cons 3.508284 .1869228 18.77 0.000 3.141922 3.874646 
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ANALYSIS 
The summary statistics available for each variable in this project are broken up to 
model the complete data and the data range limited by those observations put through 
Poisson regression (as seen in tables one and two in the preceding section). The 
conjunction of these tables works to show the general shape of the data. Both tables 
indicate that there’s a wide range of data points present for each variable. Used together, 
the tables work to show the effects of limiting the dataset to only those countries able to 
undergo a Poisson regression. The first thing to notice is the loss of observations 
between the general findings and the regression specific entries. Some variables, like 
institutional participation (coded "mli") and treaty participation ("trt"), experienced 
much more significant losses of observations than others. Each of those variables 
dropped fifty-two observations and the Gini variable ("gini") lost forty-four. On the 
other end of the spectrum the Gender Inequality Index ("gii") dropped only nineteen 
observations for the regression and educational inequality ("edu") dropped just one. 
While this is easily explained by the number of observations to begin with, it remains 
important to note because it helps provide context for the shifts in other summary 
variables. The mean and standard deviation for all variables between these two 
iterations of summary variables changed, but did so rather subtly, especially considering 
the significant observation drops for some of these variables. The fact that no alarming 
changes in summary statistics occurred seems to indicate that very little changed with 
cases at the ends of the distribution and that losses were primarily from the center. 
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Overall these two sets of summary statistics seem to make a compelling case that, while 
it would be ideal to have all one hundred and ninety-three observations, the general data 
trend is robust enough to persist without some of them. 
With the reassurance provided by the summary statistics taken care of, we now 
turn to the two Poisson regression models. Table three shows the Poisson regression for 
institutional membership. The probability for the chi2  value indicates that the model 
overall is highly significant, but the pseudo R2 value indicates that it is not an 
impressively strong model. Approximately 11.31% of the variance in the institutional 
data can be explained with the inequality data presented here based on the pseudo R2 
statistic. The vast majority of the variation is coming from a variable or variable set not 
contained within this models that is influencing the dependent variable. A closer look at 
the z statistic for the tested variables indicates a weak negative relationship between the 
Gini score and institutional participation, a negligible positive correlation between 
education and institutional participation, but a strong negative correlation between the 
Gender Inequality Index and institutional participation. Additionally, only the Gender 
Inequality Index obtains significance as a variable on this model and does so at a rather 
robust level (the probability of the given z statistic is significant at the .001 level). This 
shows with a fair degree of confidence that as gender inequality increases we should 
expect to see less participation in multilateral institutions.  
The model for treaty participation, the results of which are displayed in table 
four, is also highly significant given the probability of the chi2 statistic. Again, however, 
the R2 value indicates that the model is not particularly strong; only about 11.23% of 
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variance in this instance is explained by the model. Here, all correlations are negative, 
though gender inequality is negligible. Interesting, in direct contrast to the previous 
model, educational equality and income inequality are the variables that are statistically 
significant for treaty participation. The negative correlation for educational inequality is 
fairly strong, while the correlation for income inequality is incredibly strong. Looking at 
the related probabilities educational inequality is significant at the .005 level while 
income inequality is significant at the .001 level. In both cases this seems to suggest that 
as these dimensions of inequality increase we should expect to see reduced treaty 
participation.  
The significance of both models at the .0001 level seems to indicate that domestic 
inequality is a real factor that should not be discounted in determining international 
behavior when it comes to multilateral action. In addition, the fact that all three 
independent variables were at some point highly significant indicates that multiple 
types of inequality are salient when discussing their impact on constraining or 
permitting a willingness towards multilateral action. Since both models only work to 
explain about 11% of their respective variance, however, they cannot be taken as 
particularly strong models even though they are so significant. The lack of strength in 
both models means that these facets of inequality as measured are not sufficient to fully 
explain multilateral action on their own, and more research and models need to be run 
to grant insight into the relationship. It could be the case that this inequality model 
would be best paired with a more traditional model to create a robust synthesis of 
explanatory conditions, or it may be the case that with more accurately and 
appropriately measured variables the model will improve without any modifications to 
Domestic Inequality and Multilateral Action 21 
 
 
theory. Until more testing is done, that conclusion remains unclear and the model is 
limited in usefulness as currently presented. As a proof of concept, however, these 
models seem to support a rejection of the null hypothesis and the theorized 
directionality of research; multilateral action really does seem to be constrained by 
increases in domestic inequalities, though not to a defining degree. 
CONCLUSION 
 Ultimately the results of this research show promise as a starting point for further 
work. That said, however, and despite the high level of significance with both Poisson 
models, this research involves a plethora of important limitations and shortcomings. 
With more complete and better measured data for the variables involved, the quality of 
research and the consideration afforded to the results would increase dramatically. As 
the most obvious first step in refining the translation between theory and instantiated 
research project for the future, more care should be taken in the development of an 
educational attainment measure across a more robust sampling of countries in order to 
preserve the N size of this statistical model while increasing the efficacy of the 
educational inequality variable. An attainment test like the PISA measure done for a 
wider variety of sample countries would help bring this variable more into line with its 
ideal definition. Additionally, not every nation reports an update for the Gender 
Inequality Index or Gini scores contained in the SWIID yearly; data that is more up to 
date across the board would be desirable in the ideal scenario. Similarly, for the 
dependent variable, the ATOPS dataset contains limited types of treaties; only those that 
fall into the categories of alliance or military action are considered though other types of 
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treaties certainly exist. The membership data could also be more robust by simply 
adding more institutions that are relevant because they are active in litigating and 
guiding multilateral action or cooperation. Finally, not all aspects of domestic inequality 
or willingness toward multilateral action that were identified in theory and the literature 
review were tested in this paper both due to limitations of time and funding. Expanding 
the model to include something like content analysis of popular protests against 
multilateral institutions, compliance rates with agreements, and analysis of voting 
trends would all help deepen the scope of understanding when it comes to quantifying 
willingness towards multilateral action. Racial and ethnic inequalities, among others, 
could also be added to the set of independent variables both to test the rather broad 
implications of this research question but also to help determine the salience of various 
dimensions of inequality. Finally, a more detailed time series analysis could help 
provide a level of clarity and understanding for this work; by examining the data over as 
evolving over a time set rather than just the latest numbers available the changes in 
levels of inequality could be tied to changes in multilateral action which would facilitate 
a more powerful argument for causality. These types of modifications could increase the 
explanatory power of the model while remaining fully true to theory as was indicated at 
the end of the analysis section.  
In the meantime, current data can be used from this model synthesized with a 
broader theory to examine how analysis of inequalities might impact other theories 
about multilateral action among states. In such a project, simply adding in the relevant 
data and running the correct type of inferential statistics-based model has the potential 
to result in a conclusion with increased explanatory power and a more nuanced 
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understanding of multilateral action and its relationship to inequality. Had this research 
been given more time and resources, this is the likely next step it would have taken given 
the time and effort required to refine the instantiation of variables for a model purely 
based off of the theoretical assumptions in this research. 
 Despite these shortcomings and obvious avenues for improvement in future 
research, the initial models presented in this paper certainly show promise for 
examining inequalities as a causal factor. Inequalities, on some level, genuinely seem to 
matter in determining these dimensions of international behavior and thus should be 
considered as causes in themselves rather than by products occasionally effected by 
multilateral action. This tentative and highly qualified rejection of the null hypothesis is 
in no way enough to justify expansive practical reforms in the name of promoting 
multilateral action or deterministic statements about the behavior of nations on the 
international stage. It does, however, warrant a place of increased consideration in 
future literature if for no other reason than the significance of the regressions presented 
offer the potential for the development of more nuanced understandings of the 
mechanics of multilateral action and hold the promise of practical value in terms of 
predictive power as a generalized heuristic based on this point of view. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 5. FULL DATA ENTRY* 
Member TRT GINI GII EDU MLI 
Afghanistan 1 0.299346 0.653 58.38 7 
Albania 7 0.381436 0.238 3.28 8 
Algeria 6 0.317512 0.442 21.12 7 
Andorra 2 0.317487     2 
Angola 8 0.471113     7 
Antigua & Barbuda 0       5 
Argentina 1 0.372856 0.358 0.93 9 
Armenia 13 0.375374 0.262 0.6 8 
Australia 4 0.329768 0.109 0.72 10 
Austria 2 0.28473 0.071 1.29 14 
Azerbaijan 14 0.232356 0.318   6 
Bahamas 2 0.441461 0.340   5 
Bahrain 4 0.520825 0.222 28.89 5 
Bangladesh 1 0.331056 0.542 31.88 6 
Barbados 2 0.477305 0.284 0.22 6 
Belarus 22 0.238008 0.130   5 
Belgium 3 0.256731 0.048 4.67 15 
Belize 1 0.490404 0.386 0.09 6 
Benin 4 0.456427 0.611 53.91 6 
Bhutan 0 0.392019 0.476   6 
Bolivia 0 0.421718 0.450 9.82 7 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 3 0.393446 0.166   7 
Botswana 2 0.595557 0.434 9.83 6 
Brazil 3 0.46604 0.407 9.6 9 
Brunei 2 0.519393 0.236 21.11 6 
Bulgaria 29 0.345908 0.217 2.37 10 
Burkina Faso 4 0.379295 0.610   7 
Burundi 4 0.366727 0.471 50.43 6 
Cambodia 2 0.339888 0.473 22.22 6 
Cameroon 2 0.437456 0.569 20.73 7 
Canada 5 0.30425 0.092 0.67 13 
Cape Verde 2 0.474943     6 
Central African 
Republic 5 0.508139 0.673 51.59 6 
Chad 3 0.414161 0.708   6 
Chile 2 0.449564 0.319 2.57 9 
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China 32 0.413351 0.152 5.35 11 
Colombia 1 0.479274 0.383 6.28 8 
Comoros 5 0.51858     5 
Congo 6 0.468731 0.578 27.48 6 
Costa Rica 1 0.458765 0.300 4.67 7 
Croatia 11 0.291665 0.124 1.8 11 
Cuba 3   0.301 7.67 3 
Cyprus 2 0.300519 0.085 0.74 9 
Czech Republic 13 0.251159 0.124 0.15 11 
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 7 0.419961 0.652 44.34 7 
Denmark 3 0.269446 0.040 2.64 14 
Djibouti 4 0.425516     6 
Dominica 3 0.442085     5 
Dominican Republic 0 0.429872 0.451 8.4 7 
East Timor 1 0.308095     6 
Ecuador 0 0.417724 0.385 8.52 6 
Egypt 5 0.426802 0.449 31.12 7 
El Salvador 1 0.382535 0.392 3.72 6 
Equatorial Guinea 2 0.497007     5 
Eritrea 2       5 
Estonia 9 0.324433 0.122 0.2 10 
Ethiopia 6 0.338008 0.502   6 
Federated States of 
Micronesia 0 0.417034     5 
Fiji 1 0.386826 0.352 2.44 6 
Finland 3 0.252969 0.058 0.37 14 
France 31 0.29701 0.083 1.48 15 
Gabon 4 0.391906 0.534 14.68 6 
Gambia 4 0.412541 0.623 61.76 6 
Georgia 8 0.388412 0.350   7 
Germany 11 0.292328 0.072 1.8 15 
Ghana 5 0.413587 0.538 30.41 7 
Greece 11 0.335715 0.120 2.51 12 
Grenada 3 0.436167     5 
Guatemala 1 0.428666 0.493 23.4 7 
Guinea 5 0.360944     6 
Guinea-Bissau 4 0.44171     7 
Guyana 2 0.469804 0.504 4.79 6 
Haiti 0 0.521784 0.601 25.74 6 
Honduras 1 0.473192 0.461 13.58 7 
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Hungary 24 0.279548 0.259 0.29 10 
Iceland 2 0.249625 0.062 1.56 10 
India 7 0.471562 0.524 33.16 10 
Indonesia 4 0.474911 0.453 7.5 8 
Iran 1 0.365723 0.461 14.18 5 
Iraq 1 0.300916 0.506 24.72 5 
Ireland 2 0.297363 0.109 0.73 12 
Israel 3 0.353885 0.098 2.54 9 
Italy 13 0.335328 0.087 5.61 15 
Ivory Coast 4 0.408873 0.663 39.61 7 
Jamaica 1 0.404937 0.412 5.71 6 
Japan 3 0.318315 0.103 0.13 12 
Jordan 2 0.347192 0.460 6.98 6 
Kazakhstan 23 0.25462 0.197 0.05 7 
Kenya 3 0.436573 0.549 19.68 7 
Kiribati 1 0.383508     5 
Kuwait 3 0.322291 0.270 6.09 6 
Kyrgyzstan 17 0.334588 0.392 0.76 7 
Laos 3 0.354193 0.461 31.19 6 
Latvia 9 0.350935 0.196 0.3 12 
Lebanon 2 0.338445 0.381   6 
Lesotho 2 0.519687 0.544 12.39 7 
Liberia 5 0.349405 0.656 47.26 6 
Libya 6 0.316554 0.170 22.1 6 
Liechtenstein 1       3 
Lithuania 15 0.352598 0.123 0 11 
Luxembourg 3 0.292019 0.066 4.64 14 
Macedonia 5 0.343427 0.149   7 
Madagascar 1 0.415701     7 
Malawi 2 0.426008 0.619 18.02 6 
Malaysia 2 0.399524 0.287 6.88 8 
Maldives 1 0.402874 0.343 19.52 6 
Mali 4 0.371022 0.678 74.57 7 
Malta 2 0.270209 0.216 1.64 8 
Marshall Islands 0       5 
Mauritania 4 0.340514 0.617 32.16 6 
Mauritius 2 0.365433 0.373 5.38 6 
Mexico 0 0.447552 0.343 7.24 10 
Moldova 16 0.334485 0.226 0.98 6 
Monaco 1       2 
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Mongolia 6 0.330796 0.301 4.29 6 
Montenegro 3 0.31642 0.132   7 
Morocco 5 0.394439 0.482 43.76 8 
Mozambique 6 0.460679 0.552 68.14 7 
Myanmar 1 0.340545 0.456 16.95 7 
Namibia 2 0.588276 0.472 20.81 6 
Nauru 0 0.459821     5 
Nepal 1 0.364449 0.480 36.15 7 
Netherlands 3 0.273671 0.044 0 15 
New Zealand 1 0.331515 0.136 0.9 10 
Nicaragua 0 0.423392 0.456 17.25 6 
Niger 5 0.35143 0.649 72.85 7 
Nigeria 3 0.419802     7 
North Korea 5       2 
Norway 3 0.258787 0.048 5.74 13 
Oman 3 0.311923 0.264   5 
Pakistan 5 0.345416 0.541 45.38 7 
Palau 0 0.480662     5 
Panama 1 0.466758 0.461 7.19 7 
Papua New Guinea 4 0.476383 0.741 37.93 6 
Paraguay 1 0.451264 0.467 3.49 7 
Peru 1 0.44241 0.368 5.13 8 
Philippines 6 0.398989 0.427 2.72 8 
Poland 23 0.300627 0.132 0.27 11 
Portugal 3 0.336047 0.088 10.33 15 
Qatar 3 0.399339 0.206 3.59 5 
Romania 24 0.335924 0.311 1.7 10 
Russia 53 0.331881 0.257 0.89 8 
Rwanda 3 0.468367 0.381 45.18 6 
Samoa 1 0.430462 0.365   6 
San Marino 1       4 
Sao Tome 2 0.298975 0.538   5 
Saudi Arabia 4 0.478416 0.234 12.72 7 
Senegal 5 0.389076 0.515 58.58 6 
Seychelles 1 0.407916     6 
Sierra Leone 3 0.379693 0.645 57 6 
Singapore 1 0.383912 0.067 15.27 7 
Slovakia 15 0.2422 0.180 0.3 12 
Slovenia 4 0.247514 0.054 0.66 13 
Solomon Islands 0 0.41277     6 
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Somalia 3 0.359971     5 
South Africa 3 0.600238 0.389 5.65 8 
South Korea 4 0.303288 0.063 3.44 12 
South Sudan 3 0.459966     5 
Spain 17 0.342073 0.080 2.25 15 
Sri Lanka 1 0.492513 0.354 4.43 7 
St. Kitts and Nevis 3 0.410644     5 
St. Lucia 3 0.451334 0.333   5 
St. Vincent 3 0.472021     5 
Sudan 6 0.360952 0.564 53.74 6 
Suriname 1 0.524127 0.441   6 
Swaziland 2 0.584856 0.569 32.94 6 
Sweden 2 0.261308 0.044 2.15 13 
Switzerland 2 0.287234 0.039 1.61 12 
Syria 3 0.353608 0.547 16.19 5 
Tajikistan 13 0.445469 0.317 0.27 8 
Tanzania 4 0.443682 0.537 17.69 6 
Thailand 4 0.388096 0.393 3.44 8 
Togo 5 0.422488 0.567 39.63 6 
Tonga 1 0.373208 0.416 0.73 6 
Trinidad 2 0.416415 0.324 1.1 6 
Tunisia 5 0.384118 0.298 20.87 7 
Turkey 15 0.398897 0.317 9.18 12 
Turkmenistan 8 0.353451     6 
Tuvalu 1 0.393534     5 
UAE 3 0.394711 0.232 9.72 7 
Uganda 3 0.409505 0.523 12.18 6 
UK 6 0.328102 0.116 0.15 14 
Ukraine 32 0.262915 0.285 1.25 7 
Uruguay 0 0.360229 0.270 1.34 7 
USA 16 0.38322 0.189 0.35 13 
Uzbekistan 29 0.322818 0.274   7 
Vanuatu 0 0.376762     6 
Venezuela 0 0.373062 0.454 5.33 7 
Vietnam 3 0.37501 0.304 15.2 7 
Yemen 3 0.364318 0.834 57.49 5 
Yugoslavia 6 0.342889 0.181 2.96 7 
Zambia 4 0.54716 0.517 13.96 7 
Zimbabwe 2 0.451689 0.534 5.08 7 
*Highlighted countries are those which were removed by Poisson regression restrictions 
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TABLE 6. MEMBERSHIP DATA** 
Name ADB AfDB BIS EBRD ECB EU ICOLD IDB IMF NATO OECD UN WB WHO WTO Total 
Afghanistan 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Albania 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 8 
Algeria 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 7 
Andorra 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
Angola 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Antigua & 
Barbuda 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 5 
Argentina 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 9 
Armenia 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 8 
Australia 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 10 
Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 14 
Azerbaijan 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 6 
Bahamas 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 5 
Bahrain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 5 
Bangladesh 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Barbados 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Belarus 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 5 
Belgium 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 15 
Belize 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Benin 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Bhutan 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 6 
Bolivia 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 7 
Botswana 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Brazil 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 9 
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Brunei 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Bulgaria 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 10 
Burkina Faso 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Burundi 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Cambodia 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Cameroon 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Canada 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 13 
Cape Verde 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Central 
African 
Republic 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Chad 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Chile 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 9 
China 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 11 
Colombia 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 8 
Comoros 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 5 
Congo 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Costa Rica 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Croatia 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 11 
Cuba 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 
Cyprus 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 9 
Czech 
Republic 
0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Denmark 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 14 
Djibouti 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Dominica 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 5 
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Dominican 
Republic 
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
East Timor 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Ecuador 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Egypt 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
El Salvador 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 5 
Eritrea 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 5 
Estonia 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
Ethiopia 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 6 
Federated 
States of 
Micronesia 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 5 
Fiji 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Finland 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 14 
France 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 15 
Gabon 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Gambia 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Georgia 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Germany 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 15 
Ghana 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Greece 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 
Grenada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 5 
Guatemala 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Guinea 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Guinea-
Bissau 
0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Guyana 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
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Haiti 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Honduras 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Hungary 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
Iceland 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
India 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 10 
Indonesia 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 8 
Iran 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 5 
Iraq 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 5 
Ireland 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 12 
Israel 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 9 
Italy 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 15 
Ivory Coast 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Jamaica 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Japan 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 12 
Jordan 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Kazakhstan 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Kenya 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Kiribati 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 5 
Kuwait 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Kyrgyzstan 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Laos 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Latvia 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 
Lebanon 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 6 
Lesotho 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Liberia 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Libya 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 6 
Liechtenstein 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 3 
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Lithuania 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 
Luxembourg 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 14 
Macedonia 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Madagascar 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Malawi 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Malaysia 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 8 
Maldives 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Mali 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Malta 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 8 
Marshall 
Islands 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 5 
Mauritania 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Mauritius 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Mexico 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 10 
Moldova 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Monaco 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
Mongolia 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Montenegro 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Morocco 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 8 
Mozambique 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Myanmar 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Namibia 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Nauru 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 5 
Nepal 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Netherlands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 15 
New Zealand 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 10 
Nicaragua 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Niger 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
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Nigeria 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
North Korea 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
Norway 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 13 
Oman 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 5 
Pakistan 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Palau 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 5 
Panama 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Papua New 
Guinea 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Paraguay 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Peru 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 8 
Philippines 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 8 
Poland 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 
Portugal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 15 
Qatar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 5 
Romania 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 10 
Russia 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 8 
Rwanda 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Samoa 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
San Marino 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 4 
Sao Tome 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 5 
Saudi Arabia 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Senegal 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Seychelles 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Sierra Leone 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Singapore 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Slovakia 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 
Slovenia 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 13 
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Solomon 
Islands 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Somalia 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 5 
South Africa 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 8 
South Korea 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 12 
South Sudan 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 5 
Spain 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 15 
Sri Lanka 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
St. Kitts and 
Nevis 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 5 
St. Lucia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 5 
St. Vincent 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 5 
Sudan 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 6 
Suriname 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Swaziland 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Sweden 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 13 
Switzerland 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 12 
Syria 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 5 
Tajikistan 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 8 
Tanzania 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Thailand 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 8 
Togo 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Tonga 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Trinidad 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Tunisia 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Turkey 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 12 
Turkmenistan 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 6 
Tuvalu 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 5 
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UAE 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Uganda 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
UK 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 14 
Ukraine 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Uruguay 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
USA 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 13 
Uzbekistan 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 7 
Vanuatu 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 6 
Venezuela 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Vietnam 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Yemen 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 5 
Yugoslavia 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 7 
Zambia 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
Zimbabwe 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 7 
 ** A 0 in this model indicates a non-member and a 1 indicates a member. A fifteen in the total column would indicate 
membership in all institutions examined. 
